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Abstract	
This	work	presents	a	restructuring	of	traditional	historical	discourses	on	architectural	
typology.	A	typological	grammar	is	presented	which	advocates	a	synthesis	of	typology	with	
the	design	process.	
	
Web	Abstract	
The	prevailing	historical	discourse	on	architectural	typology	has	tended	to	present	discrete	
phases	in	its	development	which	stand	in	conflict	to	one	another.	This	research	develops	an	
alternative	interpretation	by	proposing	that	typological	thinking	is	inherent	to	act	of	design.	
It	reconsiders	historical	conceptions	of	typology	in	relation	to	the	design	process,	specifically	
linking	it	to	the	concept	of	design	thinking.	Types	are	understood	to	be	specific	
constructions	that	are	used	by	the	architect	to	frame	design	problems.	They	are	considered	
analogous	to	language	and	embed	archetypal	meaning	and	morphological	principles	which	
are	linked	through	an	internal	grammar,	depending	on	the	context	of	their	use.	This	reading	
of	type	not	only	provides	a	way	to	interpret	typology	but	it	is	also	a	means	to	connect	
existing	precedent	to	new	architecture	at	all	stages	of	the	design	process.	Through	framing	
projects	in	this	manner,	type	may	be	understood	as	a	tool	for	both	the	analysis	of	potential	
work	and	a	source	of	conjecture	for	novel	designs.	
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Typology	is	a	constantly	re-emerging	concept	in	architectural	discourse	since	the	term’s	
conception	in	the	early	19th	Century.	To	describe	an	architectural	object	involves	an	act	of	
typifying;	a	generalisation	of	built	form	to	common	characteristics.	Both	the	analysis	of	
architecture	and	its	creation	require	this	abstraction	which	offers	the	potential	to	form	
types	and	expose	initially	unapparent	relationships.	Typology’s	Enlightenment	origins	
sought	to	link	architecture	to	a	natural	order,	but	its	terminology	has	subsequently	been	
adopted	in	modernist	rejections	of	mass	culture	and	neo-rationalist	pursuits	of	continua	and	
meaning.	Despite	widespread	use	of	the	term,	the	role	typology	plays	in	the	process	of	
design	remain	unclear.	Attempts	to	link	its	academic	origins	to	the	creation	of	architectural	
form	(notably	by	Gottfried	Semper	in	the	19th	Century,	and	Guilio	Carlo	Argan	and	Aldo	
Rossi	in	the	20th	Century)	have	done	little	to	synthesise	the	two,	and	have	merely	succeeded	
to	alienate	it	from	practice.	
	
While	theorists	of	type	have	debated	its	origins,	the	use	of	the	term	in	practice	has	often	
been	reduced	to	naïve	functional	approximations	that	represent	little	in	common	other	than	
a	similarity	of	use.	This	oversimplification	was	legitimised	in	Pevsner’s	History	of	Building	
types	in	which	buildings	were	categorised	and	arranged	from	‘the	most	monumental	to	the	
least	monumental,	from	the	most	ideal	to	the	most	utilitarian,	from	national	monuments	to	
factories’.1	Yet	Pevsner	exposes	the	challenge	of	this	categorisation,	firstly	through	the	
almost	unmanageable	number	of	types	a	comprehensive	catalogue	would	need	to	contain,	
and	secondly,	the	seemingly	endless	appearance	of	novel	functional	requirements.	
	
Pevsner	inadvertently	raises	the	problem	of	terminology	and	the	ambiguity	of	type.	Indeed,	
typology	and	type	are	often	used	interchangeably	yet	they	represent	distinct	concepts.	The	
former	refers	to	the	system,	the	categorical	structure	or	the	means	of	defining	the	field	of	
the	latter.2	The	method	of	categorisation	may	vary	and	that	gives	rise	to	different	typologies	
which	may	host	a	variety	of	types.	A	precedent	is	a	single	instance	or	isolated	example	in	
contrast	to	a	type,	which	is	a	non-physical	entity,	or	a	typology,	which	refers	to	the	means	of	
categorising.	Acknowledging	that	any	given	architectural	singularity	has	some	common	
characteristics	with	another,	and	its	situational	nature	makes	it	unique,	identifying	its	type	
provides	a	way	of	connecting	the	particular	to	the	universal.	
	
Type’s	relationship	to	practice	is	complicated	further	by	the	ill-defined	nature	of	the	process	
of	design.	Design	methods,	design	methodology	and	design	thinking	have	all	been	used	to	
describe	the	specific	processes	that	designers	go	through	in	the	creation	of	new	artefacts.	
This	evolving	field	encompasses	diverse	approaches	such	as	deterministic	processes,	
reflective	practice	and	heuristic	methods.	Of	the	multiple	attempts	to	classify	these	
cognitive	processes,	Designerly	ways	of	Knowing,	introduced	by	Nigel	Cross,3	and	its	more	
recent	incarnation	as	Design	Thinking,	bares	remarkable	similarities	with	the	paradoxical	
relationship	between	the	particular	and	the	universal	embodied	by	typology.	Design	
Thinking,	as	described	by	Kees	Dorst,	utilises	a	mode	of	logical	operation	known	as	
abduction.4	In	contrast	to	deduction	and	induction,	abduction	involves	the	generation	of	
concrete	reality	from	a	set	of	general	principles	and	specific	values.	It	is	this	relationship	
that	lies	at	the	core	of	both	typological	design	and	design	thinking.	As	this	paper	will	set	out,	
type	formation	is	a	necessary	component	of	design	production.	
	
Although	the	formal	study	of	typology	has	only	been	apparent	in	architectural	theory	since	
the	enlightenment,5	this	notional	historical	genesis	undermines	the	all-encompassing	nature	
of	typological	thought	that	has	permeated	architecture	since	antiquity.	The	establishment	
of	architecture	as	an	autonomous	field,	in	which	architectural	form	acquired	specific	
definition	necessitates	type	formation	yet	its	use	as	a	means	of	interpreting	and	structuring	
the	process	of	design	has	been	limited.6	In	part	this	may	be	due	to	a	rejection	of	
simultaneous	typological	concepts	as	well	as	the	embodiment	of	ideological	stances	that	
exclude	multiple	interpretive	categorisation.	
	
Throughout	the	history	of	typology	there	has	been	a	tension	between	its	conception	as	a	set	
of	formal	constructs	and	the	type’s	fundamental	conditions	embodying	meaning.7	This	
paper	argues	that	these	definitions	are	not	mutually	exclusive	but	rather	contribute	to	a	
richer	understanding	of	type	which	operates	like	language,	governed	by	grammars	which	
mediate	the	relationship	between	meaning	and	form.	This	has	implications	for	designers;	to	
satisfy	the	requirements	of	a	user,	a	built	work	must	embody	values	which	align	to	
aspirations	and	the	selection	of	an	appropriate	type	becomes	essential	to	transfer	desired	
meaning.	
	
Typology	and	universal	meaning	
	
The	formal	history	of	typology	has	typically	addressed	the	issue	of	universality,	whether	that	
be	through	universal	human	condition,	repeatable	form	or	shared	experience.	The	earliest	
acknowledged	writings	directly	addressing	the	notion	of	architectural	typology	are	credited	
to	Antoine-Chrysostome	Quatremère	de	Quincy.8	Born	out	of	Enlightenment	philosophy,	it	
coincided	with	the	efforts	of	classification	in	the	natural	sciences	hoping	that	categorising	
the	past	would	reveal	principles	which	may	be	applied	to	design	or,	in	the	case	of	biology,	
reveal	theoretical	new	species.	9	Quatremère’s	process	was	one	of	abstraction,	a	rational	
deconstruction	of	architecture	to	notional	origins	founded	in	the	natural	order.	His	typology	
was	intended	to	connect	unique	architectural	instances	with	their	past	and	universality	
could	form	the	basis	of	any	number	of	unique	outcomes.	It	offered	a	reductionist	version	of	
history	reconstructing	its	path	in	rational	terms.	
	
Important	to	recognise	is	the	distinction	that	Quatremère	made	between	the	abstract	
concept	of	type	as	a	theoretical	idea	and	the	model,	which	he	saw	as	form	to	be	emulated,	
stripping	type	of	its	meaning.	Type	was	the	underlying	reason	of	the	object	derived	from	
base	anthropological	conditions.	Through	the	use	of	available	materials	and	dependant	on	
the	demands	of	construction,	types	emerged	which	were	perpetuated	and	refined	by	
tradition	and	gained	authenticity	through	historical	usage.	Eventually	they	could	transcend	
their	material	origins,	from	timber	into	stone	in	classical	architecture,	for	example.	
	
Quatremère	lamented	both	the	understanding	of	type	as	an	imitative	model	as	well	as	the	
complete	rejection	of	type;	the	former	‘repressing	this	art	within	the	bonds	of	an	imitative	
servility’10	while	the	latter	freeing	it	from	any	constraint	to	make	it	meaningless.	He	appears	
to	be	calling	for	a	measured	approach	to	design,	a	gradual	refinement	and	adaptation	of	the	
type	in	response	to	cultural	conditions	and	technologies.	Yet,	his	emphasis	on	fundamental	
conditions	as	the	foundation	of	typological	thinking	limit	its	value	as	a	synthetic	tool.	The	
categorisation	of	most	architecture	as	belonging	to	a	small	number	of	universal	types	is	too	
broad	to	draw	any	kind	of	useful	distinction	that	may	inform	design.	
	
While	Quatremère	separated	the	concept	of	model	and	type,	Gottfried	Semper	attempted	
to	synthesise	fundamental	human	experience	with	the	physical	world.	Four	elements	(the	
hearth,	the	mound,	enclosure	and	the	roof)	common	across	antiquity,	fulfilled	physical	and	
spiritual	universal	human	needs.11	These	indivisible	urtypen,	from	which	all	other	forms	
evolved,	were	characterised	by	their	function	and	linked	to	processes	as	opposed	to	any	
particular	form.	The	artistic	object	became	a	unique	transformation	of	these	basic	types	
through	the	act	of	construction;	the	hut	for	example	could	be	considered	a	response	to	an	
essential	human	need	but	the	process	of	its	making,	techniques	and	materials,	operate	
within	a	constantly	changing	social	context.	
	
If	Quatremère’s	version	of	type	precedes	physical	creation,	Semper,	through	the	concept	of	
style,	transforms	the	universality	of	type	into	specific	form.12	According	to	Semper,	this	was	
guided	by	the	‘influences	of	climate,	natural	surroundings	and	so	on’13	giving	rise	to	various	
‘developments	of	the	building	instinct’14	which	he	links	to	four	pre-Hellenic	societies	
(Chinese,	Egyptian,	Assyrian	and	Phoenician).	What	Semper	begins	to	describe	is	akin	to	an	
architectural	grammar,	a	set	of	principles	which	governed	the	combination	and	
manifestation	of	archetypal	conditions.	
	
Typology	and	design	
	
The	challenge	faced	by	protagonists	of	type	is	its	application	to	the	design	process	in	a	
coherent	manner.	The	Enlightenment	quest	for	the	natural	origins	of	architecture	limits	its	
possibility	as	a	tool	for	design.	At	a	similar	time	to	Quatremère,	Jean-Nicholas-Louis	Durand	
constructed	an	empirical	typology	of	building	axes,	defined	by	diagrammatic	abstractions	of	
functional	genres,	then	furnished	with	pre-defined	components	forming	models	for	
emulation.	Part	3	of	his	Précis	on	the	Lectures	of	Architecture	breaks	down	the	city	into	its	
constituent	parts;	elements	of	the	city	(gates,	streets,	public	squares	etc.),	public	buildings	
(temples,	libraries,	colleges	etc.)	and	private	buildings	(townhouses,	apartments,	tenements	
etc.).15	For	each	part	he	offers	a	brief	discourse	relating	them	back	to	classical	antiquity	as	
well	as	illustrations	of	model	examples.	It	was	his	intention	to	enable	students	to	design	
through	modification	of	the	idealised	genre	diagram	to	meet	more	specific	briefs	however	
isolates	form	through	function,	removing	them	from	archetypal	meaning.	
	
Durand’s	version	of	universality	is	one	of	model	form.	In	his	diagrammatic	approach,	rooms	
supporting	functions	are	mapped	onto	abstracted	circulation	structures.	Durand	assumed	
the	city	was	a	static	entity	and	accordingly	does	not	account	for	changing	functional	
requirements.	His	work	implies	a	neutrality	of	form	yet	it	is	the	relationship	between	mass	
and	space	that	embody	archetypal	ideals	underpinning	our	reading	of	the	architecture.	This	
highlights	the	inherent	problem	associated	with	the	instrumentality	of	type.	His	diagrams	
struggle	to	escape	the	status	of	the	model;	they	are	indicative	of	form,	failing	to	capture	all	
the	possible	spatial	configurations.	Whether	deduced	from	function	or	abstracted	spatial	
conditions,	as	soon	as	pen	is	put	to	paper,	the	type	becomes	a	singularity,	undermining	the	
multiplicity	that	the	type	embodies.	If	Quatremère	presents	an	alienated	abstraction	of	
type,	Durand	shows	us	an	instrumentalised	yet	limiting	version	of	the	concept.	
	
Carlo	Argan’s	1963	article	On	the	Typology	of	Architecture	marked	the	beginning	of	renewed	
interest	in	the	field	and	its	relationship	to	the	design	process.	He	sought	to	make	a	stage	
based	model	of	design	(plan	to	structural	system	to	surface	treatment)	analogous	with,	as	
he	saw	it,	the	three	major	classification	systems	of	architecture	(configuration,	structure	
and	decorative	elements).16	Argan’s	rather	mechanised	and	linear	version	of	the	design	
process	nevertheless	recognises	the	interrelationship	between	typological	thought	and	
design	creation.	He	believed	that	any	project	that	had	its	demands	rooted	in	the	past	
requires	a	critical	development	of	previous	solutions	embodied	by	its	type.	
	
Argan	understood	both	the	repetition	and	the	ignorance	of	type	to	be	unacceptable	
however	assumed	the	possibility	of	each.	Six	years	later,	Alan	Colquhoun	suggested	
architects	could	never	be	freed	from	the	forms	of	the	past,	thus	to	ignore	typology	is	to	lose	
control	of	the	communicative	power	of	architecture.17	To	Colquhoun	purely	deterministic	
processes	brought	about	by	modernism	and	functionalism	were	inadequate	and	left	a	void	
in	the	design	process	which	ran	the	risk	of	being	filled	by	free	expression,	stripping	
architecture	of	its	meaning.	
	
This	debasing	of	the	modernist	type	was	taken	up	by	Anthony	Vidler	in	his	article	The	Third	
Typology	published	in	1977	in	which	he	articulates	a	typological	position	which	uses	the	city	
as	its	source.18	Unlike	functionalism	or	theories	of	natural	origins,	he	saw	this	typology	as	
one	founded	in	the	autonomy	of	urban	form.	This	empirical	typology	had	the	capacity	to	
embed	‘three	levels	of	meaning-the	first,	inherited	from	the	ascribed	means	of	the	past	
existence	of	the	forms;	the	second,	derived	from	the	specific	fragment	and	its	boundaries,	
and	often	crossing	between	previous	types;	the	third,	proposed	by	a	recomposition	of	these	
fragments	in	a	new	context.’19	Vidler	saw	a	need	to	reclaim	a	‘critical	role	to	public	
architecture’	through	the	vehicle	of	this	new	typology,	implicitly	placing	design	at	its	core.	
	
Vidler,	draws	from	the	work	of	the	neo-rationalists,	especially	Aldo	Rossi	whose	own	
writings	and	works	present	a	case	for	typological	thinking.	Like	Quatremère,	Rossi	saw	type	
as	a	principle	prior	to	form,	however,	seeks	not	to	uncover	abstracted	values,	but	those	that	
have	come	about	through	shared	creation	of	the	city.	Rossi’s	types	were	empirically	derived	
and	focused	on	re-using	the	urban	forms	which	was	seen	as	a	continuous	morphology.	
Types	emerged	from	built	structure	as	a	product	of	social	order	rather	than	a	direct	result	of	
primitive	human	conditions.	He	considered	type	as	being	the	very	idea	of	architecture20	and	
all	theories	of	architecture	were	typological.	Any	one	type	may	manifest	itself	in	any	
number	of	forms	and	all	forms	are	reducible	to	type.		
	
Rossi	saw	construction	as	the	process	through	which	analysis	could	become	concrete,	in	this	
way	type	elevated	from	a	theoretical	ideal.	His	work	presents	a	tension	between	the	general	
(type)	and	specific	memory,	the	buildings	some	kind	of	manifestation	of	fundamental	
being.21	In	his	early	career,	Rossi’s	application	of	type	was	both	a	conscious	and	scientific	act	
initiated	by	deep	analysis	of	the	city.	The	quest	for	objectivity	lead	him	to	an	architecture	of	
primary	forms22	and	inextricably	links	it	to	the	very	determinism	that	Colquhoun	is	reacting	
to.	Despite	radically	different	conceptions	of	typology,	Rossi’s	approach	shares	similarities	
with	Gottfried	Semper’s	Doctrine	of	Style	which	suggested	that	fundamental	types	were	
given	form	through	the	process	of	craft.	It	is	in	the	act	of	making,	the	application	of	
available	technologies	and	materials,	that	type	is	given	form	and	becomes	an	expression	of	
base	human	conditions.	Rossi	comes	close	to	generating	a	more	complex	vision.	His	work	
suggests	a	uniqueness	of	type	to	cultural	context	and	through	focussing	on	the	forms	of	the	
city	as	the	lens	in	which	to	reveal	type,	analytical	study	becomes	a	precursor	to	typological	
thought.	
	
Design	thinking	
	
To	limit	typological	thought	to	those	protagonists	that	actively	engaged	with	its	terminology	
is	to	undermine	its	pervasiveness	in	architectural	thinking.	Design	is	a	process	of	
abstraction,	whereby	potential	reality	is	codified,	manipulated	and	restructured.	Type	
utilisation	may	be	a	conscious	action	in	which	the	designer	selects	a	type	appropriate	to	
context	and	function	which	can	convey	specific	meaning,	however,	it	may	also	be	an	
unconscious	act	which	arises	in	the	creation	of	form.	
	
Understanding	the	design	process	is	key	to	realising	the	relationship	between	typological	
thought	and	design.	In	the	1970s,	interest	in	design	theory	gave	rise	to	numerous	cognitive	
models	describing	its	cognitive	processes	in	part	due	to	a	desire	to	apply	scientific	
methodologies	to	design.	Herbert	Simon’s	Science	of	the	Artificial,	written	in	1969,	outlined	
a	problem	solving	theory	of	design	in	which	designs	were	considered	problems	which	were	
first	analysed	and	then	solutions	proposed.23	In	Simon’s	model,	any	complex	problem	could	
be	broken	down	into	consistently	smaller	ones	which	could	be	tackled	individually.	It	relied	
on	the	assumption	that	design	arose	as	a	response	to	a	particular	need,	and	could	therefore	
be	considered	problematic.	
	
Simon’s	analysis/synthesis	approach	became	untenable	in	the	light	of	research	into	the	
problems	designers	actually	face.	Very	few	design	problems	involve	straightforward	analysis	
of	an	issue	followed	by	the	creation	of	a	solution.	More	often	than	not,	design	problems	
have	undefined	desired	outcomes,	the	processes	to	produce	solutions	are	unclear	and	it	is	
not	apparent	when	a	successful	solution	has	been	achieved.	Horst	Rittel	and	Melvin	Webber	
described	such	problems	as	wicked	requiring	a	whole	new	kind	of	thinking.24	
	
Alternatives	to	the	problem	solving	model	arose	which	embraced	the	heuristic	approach	of	
actual	designers	including	Donald	Schön’s	reflective	practice,25	the	hermeneutic	models	of	
Bill	Hillier26	and	the	participatory	approaches	described	by	Nigel	Cross.27	Of	considerable	
influence	on	the	field	was	the	restructuring	of	the	scientific	method	embarked	upon	by	Karl	
Popper	in	which	he	questioned	prevailing	inductive	methodologies	in	favour	of	one	based	
around	the	concept	of	falsification.28	His	theory	of	Critical	Rationalism	outlined	a	
conjecture/analysis	approach	to	scientific	discovery	in	which	scientists	made	informed	
guesses	which	they	then	attempted	to	prove	false.	Popper’s	theory	was	adopted	to	design,	
notably	by	Jane	Darke29	and	Michael	Brawne.30	Problematic	in	the	application	of	Popperian	
science	to	design	is	the	lack	of	formal	frameworks	for	assessing	the	success	of	a	conjectured	
solution.	While	in	classical	science	one	is	able	to	make	observations	to	attempt	to	validate	
hypotheses,	in	design	this	often	not	possible.	Moreover,	when	faced	with	wicked	problems,	
it	may	not	even	be	clear	when	this	has	been	achieved.	In	order	to	tackle	this,	the	designer	is	
required	to	engage	in	design	thinking;	a	mode	of	cognitive	processing	outside	of	the	
traditional	deductive/inductive	dichotomy.	
	
The	first	discussion	of	design	thinking	could	be	attributed	to	Nigel	Cross’s	1982	article	
Designerly	Ways	of	Knowing	which	set	out	the	case	for	treating	design	as	an	autonomous	
academic	discipline.31	At	the	heart	of	Cross’s	design	thinking	is	the	ability	of	the	designer	to	
transform	abstract	patterns	into	concrete	ones	through	the	use	of	internalised	codes	or	the	
adoption	of	a	language.	This	can	be	described	as	framing,	a	concept	which	has	its	roots	in	
the	social	sciences.32	Framing	involves	synthesising	the	aspirational	values	of	a	project	with	
the	principles	that	govern	its	formal	creation.33	The	designer	constructs	a	project	frame	in	
order	to	reveal	a	solution	but	also	to	provide	shape	to	the	underlying	values	and	formal	
possibilities.	In	the	conjecture/analysis	model	of	design,	the	project	frame	provides	a	
framework	for	both	the	conjecture	of	new	proposals	and	the	assessment	of	trial	solutions.	
	
It	is	in	the	act	of	framing	that	the	designer	confronts	the	paradox	of	the	universal	and	
specific.	Through	restructuring	the	design	situation	general	principles	are	made	synonymous	
with	specific	aspirational	value	in	order	to	form	concrete	reality.	Donald	Schön’s	description	
of	framing,	written	in	the	early	1980s,	describes	a	dialogue	between	a	critic	and	a	student	in	
which	they	enter	into	a	frame	discourse,	in	this	case	‘the	spaghetti	bowl’	versus	‘the	
Renaissance	order’.	34	These	seemingly	straightforward	metaphors	are	the	mechanisms	
through	which	not	only	the	design	is	created	but	also	allow	it	to	be	analysed.	As	Dorst	notes,	
the	frame	actually	embodies	a	complex	set	of	statements	which	enable	the	desired	value	to	
be	achieved	through	a	series	of	generic	principles.	
	
The	relationship	between	the	underlying	values	of	a	design	situation	and	the	principles	that	
govern	formal	creation	represent	the	inherent	typological	reasoning	of	design.	In	whatever	
way	a	project	is	framed,	the	designer	is	engaged	in	a	form	of	type	creation;	the	
identification	of	a	transferable	metaphor	which	captures	the	potential	for	the	creation	of	
meaning.	By	implication,	types	are	infinite,	personal	and	arbitrary.	In	Schön’s	design	studio,	
it	is	hard	not	to	engage	in	a	discussion	on	frame	validity;	this	is	the	very	mechanism	through	
which	the	design	is	critiqued.	The	typological	question	is	not	whether	the	spaghetti	bowl	is	
in	itself	a	type,	but	rather,	how	valid	is	this	type?	Making	frames	and	types	synonymous,	
underpins	the	relevancy	of	typology	in	the	process	of	space	creation.	It	has	the	potential	to	
engender	conjecture	and	structure	critique	of	the	design	process.		
	
Type	and	language	
	
In	a	given	design	situation,	adopting	a	type	is	analogous	to	use	a	language	in	which	that	
building	speaks,	governed	by	a	set	of	structural	rules;	a	grammar.	A	spoken	language	is	
expressed	in	utterances,	each	individual	and	potentially	unique	constructs.	In	the	
structuralism	of	Ferdinand	de	Saussure,	these	parts	are	termed	langue	(the	set	of	rules	and	
codes	that	constitute	a	language)	and	parole	(a	unique	utterance).35	Similarly,	an	
architectural	type	maybe	considered	in	these	terms;	the	canon	of	built	work	within	a	type	
forms	parole,	defined	by	principles	particular	to	the	desired	meaning.	In	this	structuralist	
typology,	types	are	defined	by	desired	archetypal	conditions	which	are	made	manifest	
through	general	principles	of	building,	supporting	any	number	of	unique	constructs.	Binding	
the	two	is	the	grammar	of	the	type,	itself	particular	to	a	context	and	cultural	association.	
Recognising	the	appropriate	framing	of	a	design	situation	may	connect	the	value	of	a	
project	to	its	appropriate	formal	possibilities	given	any	particular	cultural	condition.	
	
The	analogy	of	architecture	with	language	has	been	widespread.		Notably,	the	comparison	is	
made	by	Colquhoun	who	questions	the	assumption	that	in	art	and	architecture,	parole	
emerges	from	free	expression	of	langue.	36	This	relationship	is	governed	by	socially	agreed	
aesthetic	norms	and	principles	which	constitute	a	grammar.	To	Colquhoun,	this	grammar	is	
typological,	emerging	from	either	fixed	underlying	forms	(archetypes)	or	a	fragmented	
historical	inheritance.	It	is	a	language	of	all	architecture,	representing	its	entire	ability	to	
communicate.	However,	to	refocus	this	analogy,	realising	the	linguistic	possibilities	of	type	
itself	allows	a	richer	reading	of	the	concept.	Rather	than	type	acting	as	a	grammar,	it	
becomes	a	language	and	through	its	expression	makes	possible	the	synthesis	of	archetypal	
conditions	with	potential	morphologies.	
	
Unlike	language	however,	types	themselves	embody	value	as	well	as	potential	form,	both	of	
which	generate	meaning.	Architectural	form	is	never	neutral	and	not	only	is	any	singularity	a	
signifier	of	overt	meaning	but	the	constructed	type	connotes	value.	Moreover,	to	
understand	type	formation	as	frame	creation	leaves	the	possibility	for	new	types	to	be	
constantly	brought	into	being	by	the	creative	designer.	The	ever	shifting	dialogue	between	
specific	value	and	universal	principles	necessitate	the	designer	to	invent	a	language	with	
which	they	process	any	design	situation.	
	
Both	Quatremère	and	Semper,	discuss	the	evolution	of	generic	conditions	to	specific	
cultural	form,	embodying	meaning.	Similarly,	Rossi’s	work	generates	a	language	through	a	
reading	of	the	city.	The	desire	for	universality	however	again	undermines	the	creation	of	the	
type	limited	by	the	desire	for	natural	formation,	whether	from	first	principles	or	observed	
conditions.	The	potential	of	type	as	simultaneously	a	universal	and	individual	idea,	
constructed	by	the	designer	is	that	it	allows	type	to	be	shaped	to	specific	design	situations.	
	
Conveying	meaning	comes	not	from	a	single	source	but	from	the	ability	of	a	building	to	be	a	
sign	and	a	signifier	simultaneously.	The	source	of	meaning	in	both	cases,	however	is	
inherently	related	to	cultural	relevance.	The	association	between	archetypal	condition	and	
general	principles	that	are	embedded	in	type	are	entirely	dependent	on	context	and	is	
governed	by	grammar;	the	cultural	force	which	binds	the	universal	and	the	unique.	A	type	
consists	of	three	principle	parts;	its	archetype	(the	particular	human	condition	which	it	
embodies),	its	general	morphological	principles	and	grammar	(a	set	codes	which	define	the	
relationship	between	the	two).	Morphology	in	this	case	refers	not	to	visual	diagrams	or	
models	but	rather	the	set	of	rules	that	define	the	creation	of	form	and	spatial	relationships.	
	
Rossi	presents	us	with	an	application	of	a	typological	language	in	his	City	Hall	project	for	
Trieste	(the	example	is	used	by	Vidler	to	demonstrate	the	communicative	power	of	the	type	
as	well	as	its	potential	transformative	nature37).	In	the	project	there	is	a	clear	reference	to	
the	18th	Century	prison	as	well	as	the	arcade,	which	construct	a	typological	frame.	This	not	
only	guides	the	morphological	principles	of	the	scheme	but	also	ascribes	specific	meaning	to	
the	project,	in	this	case	civility	through	the	reminder	of	the	dialectic	between	the	
metaphors.	The	type	is,	of	course,	is	an	invention;	the	project	neither	belongs	to	a	schema	
of	prisons	nor	to	what	would	be	conventionally	recognised	as	a	town-hall.	However,	Rossi	
captures	archetypal	values	and	links	this	to	a	morphological	expression	which	only	makes	
sense	given	the	grammar	of	the	type,	in	this	case	the	conventional	associations	with	the	
prison	form.	As	Vidler	notes:	‘the	society	that	understands	the	reference	to	prison	will	still	
have	need	of	the	reminder,	while	at	the	very	point	that	the	image	finally	loses	all	meaning,	
the	society	will	either	have	become	entirely	prison,	or,	perhaps,	its	opposite’.38	
	
Rossi’s	use	of	a	typological	frame	to	structure	the	project	not	only	informs	his	decision	
making	process	but	also	provides	a	framework	for	critique.	However,	to	suggest	that	Rossi’s	
work	is	a	pure	scientific	endeavour	is	untenable.	His	obsession	with	purist	formalism,	plainly	
stated	in	his	Scientific	Autobigraphy,39	especially	in	his	early	works,	led	to	a	series	of	works	
that	appear,	as	Alan	Lipman	asserts,	‘impassive,	unyielding,	forbidding;	the	spaces	de	
Chirico-like	in	their	aloofness,	in	their	silent	suppressions.’40	The	obsession	with	objects	
leads	the	work	to	be	somewhat	devoid	of	human	agency	revealing	a	misunderstanding	of	a	
type	grammar.	In	the	case	of	the	Trieste	project,	the	grammar	represents	an	over-
simplification	of	social	meaning	and	austerity	of	the	project	emerges	through	a	personal	
desire	for	architectural	autonomy.	Furthermore,	one	must	ask	if	the	prison	and	arcade	is	the	
appropriate	metaphor	to	frame	the	social	conditions	of	civility.	
	
Type	formation	
	
The	historical	focus	on	the	discovery	of	types,	either	through	rational	or	empirical	means,	is	
called	into	question	when	framing	design	as	a	mode	of	typological	thinking.	The	implications	
of	project	frame	and	type	synthesis	suggests	that	types	are	almost	infinitely	numerous.	
Indeed,	new	languages	may	be	artificially	created	or	evolve	from	existing	languages.	Given	
the	tripartite	relationship	between	archetypal	conditions,	morphological	principles	and	type	
grammar	three	distinct	possibilities	arise.	Firstly,	the	definition	of	new	modes	of	being,	
secondly,	the	creation	of	novel	formal	relationships,	and	thirdly	the	reassigning	of	meaning	
to	form.		
	
The	creation	new	archetypal	conditions	requires	the	architect	to	define	new	ways	of	
dwelling.	In	the	history	of	typology,	those	dealing	with	fundamental	human	conditions	have	
sought	to	reveal	these	either	through	rationalism	(Quatremère	de	Quincy	for	example)	or	
through	empirical	study	(exemplified	by	Rossi).	Quatremère’s	attempt	to	deconstruct	
architectural	history	generates	artificial	anthropological	states	which	have	seemingly	little	
relevance	to	contemporary	meaning.	Rossi’s	broader	attempt	to	uncover	meaning	through	
looking	at	pre-existing	form	provides	a	more	grounded	approach	to	archetypal	selection	yet	
is	limited	by	the	possibilities	of	the	city	as	a	source	of	cultural	legitimacy.	Archetypal	
conditions	cannot	be	created	but	represent	some	fundamental	act	of	being	embodied	by	
built	work	and	revealed	by	the	designer.	
	
Arguably	the	prototypical	architecture	of	modernism,	itself	a	reaction	to	the	vagaries	of	
popular	culture,	was	an	attempt	to	herald	new	ways	of	inhabitation,	deriving	new	
archetypal	conditions	from	mechanised	production.	Modernism’s	overt	departure	from	
historicism	allowed	the	invention	of	type	as	a	social	and	ideological	tool.41	The	reduction	of	
the	individual	to	the	typical	justified	repetitive	formal	units.	In	a	further	departure	from	
precedent,	functionalism	promoted	a	causal	relationship	between	use	and	form.	As	Argan	
asserts,	industrialisation	gave	rise	to	new	functional	requirements	that	previous	building	
types	were	ill-equipped	to	deal	with	and	the	emergence	of	new	types.42	The	failing	of	the	
modernist	‘type’	is	the	assumed	link	between	type	and	function	which	is	undermined	both	
by	the	re-appropriation	of	buildings	and	the	variance	of	form	between	buildings	of	a	similar	
function.	
	
The	creation	of	new	formal	relationships	and	strategies	appears	at	first	to	be	a	distinct	
possibility	in	the	creation	of	type.	However,	as	Philip	Steadman	points	out,	the	generic	
functions	of	building	(the	need	for	shelter,	ventilation,	light,	technology	etc.)	have	
necessitated	a	relatively	limited	number	of	formal	arrangements.43	His	analysis	recognises	
consistent	formal	strategies	in	a	variety	of	building	functions	due	to	these	universal	
demands.	While	theoretically	possible,	generating	a	novel	series	of	morphological	principles	
runs	into	issues	as	often	they	require	radically	new	ways	of	dwelling	to	facilitate	
inhabitation.	Steadman	argues	that	types	follow	‘morphological	trajectories’;	an	evolution	
of	form	to	shifting	usage	patterns.	This	moderate	shift	in	design	principles	echoes	the	
evolutionary	versions	of	architectural	history	advanced	by	Semper	and	Quatremère	and	
questions	the	necessity,	or	even	possibility,	to	generate	totally	new	formal	conditions.	
	
Despite	this,	the	advance	of	building	technologies	draws	into	question	the	principles	of	
formal	creation	that	have	governed	spatial	form.	To	deny	historical	influence	in	favour	of	
either	pseudo-determinism	or	total	free	will	undermines	the	grammar	that	ties	meaning	to	
form.	The	built	work	compromises	its	ability	to	carry	value	as	there	is	no	shared	link	
between	the	work	and	its	purpose.	As	Colquhoun	notes	‘it	would	seem	that	we	ought	to	
accept	a	value	system	which	takes	account	of	the	forms	and	the	solutions	of	the	past,	if	we	
are	to	retain	control	over	concepts	which	will	obtrude	themselves	into	the	creative	process,	
whether we	are	aware	of	it	or	not’.44	
	
To	create	a	new	grammar	of	type	is	to	re-establish	the	relationship	between	meaning	and	
form.	Yet	despite	attempts	to	do	so,	architects	are	rarely	able	to	escape	underlying	cultural	
forces	that	tie	the	two	together.	Overt	attempts	in	post-modernism	succeeded	only	in	
subverting	the	denotive	properties	of	architecture	and	inevitably	failed	to	re-structure	the	
underlying	archetype/morphology	relationship.	Indeed,	as	a	conscious	act	this	involved	the	
recognition	of	the	existence	of	the	initial	type	to	allow	the	possibility	of	subversion.	
Conversely,	the	complete	ignorance	or	rejection	of	a	grammar	undermines	the	possibilities	
to	consciously	control	the	communicative	possibilities	of	a	work.	
	
Making	design	itself	an	act	of	typological	reasoning,	suggests	that	types	themselves	are	
specific	and	unique,	yet	these	are	bound	by	the	conditions	of	human	experience	and	the	
possibilities	of	building.	To	frame	a	design	situation	typologically	involves	the	creation	of	a	
unique	type,	one	which	embodies	aspired	value,	morphological	principles	linked	by	a	
contextual	grammar.	The	creativity	of	the	designer	is	to	draw	specific	conditions	from	the	
vast	array	of	human	experience,	to	recognise	its	contextual	possibilities	and	to	realise	
appropriate	principles	of	construction.	In	this	formulation	of	type,	the	historical	
preoccupation	with	its	origins	are	rejected	in	favour	of	a	pluralist	approach	in	which	type	
may	embody	a	rich	array	of	meaning.	Once	the	need	for	the	absolute	universality	of	type	is	
disregarded,	a	far	wider	pool	of	human	experience	may	be	drawn	from.	
	
Implications	for	design	
	
To	consider	typology	as	a	ubiquitous	mode	of	thought	risks	dissolving	its	autonomy	as	an	
architectural	contrition.	Yet,	simultaneously,	its	power	is	enhanced	as	a	method	of	analysing	
and	creating	architecture.	To	see	a	project	frame	as	a	typological	one	allows	the	designer	to	
assess	the	suitability	of	formal	manifestations	with	regard	to	their	archetypal	connotations.	
Moreover,	it	allows	association	and	reference	from	the	canon	of	built	work	which	shares	
similar	typological	characteristics.	It	is	conceivable	that	different	types	may	share	similar	or	
identical	archetypal	conditions	or	alternatively	appear	to	have	common	morphologies	yet	it	
is	the	relationship	between	the	two	which	defines	their	uniqueness.	The	designer	must	
adopt	a	language	in	which	to	communicate	the	value	of	their	work.	
	
There	is	a	latent	typological	force	that	informs	prejudices	and	defines	the	genesis	of	
architecture.	It	is	as	relevant	in	design	today	as	at	any	point	in	history,	perhaps	more	so	
given	the	seemingly	unbridled	capacity	of	architectural	technology.	As	Colquhoun	
recognised,	without	acknowledging	the	transformation	of	the	archetype,	it	is	defined	by	
subconscious	thought,	impoverishing	architectural	expression	or	risking	misinterpretation.45	
The	widespread	use	of	digital	design	as	well	as	novel	building	techniques	mean	the	universal	
principles	which	have	traditionally	mediated	the	expression	of	architecture	are	being	drawn	
into	question.	The	rise	of	computational	determinism	mimics	the	ahistorical	approach	of	
modernism.	Through	the	rejection	of	types	founded	in	tradition	and	precedent	and	a	belief	
the	objectivity	of	the	formal	object,	it	risks	opening	the	door	for	arbitrary	form	stripped	of	
meaning.	While	digitalisation	may	represent	a	rewriting	of	the	universal	principles	of	
building	it	must	be	connected,	through	a	shared	cultural	grammar,	to	archetypal	modes	of	
human	existence.	Placing	the	user	at	the	centre	of	the	process	becomes	imperative.		
	
Conclusion	
	
Understanding	type	as	a	language,	simultaneously	liberates	the	concept	from	its	purely	
analytic	origins	yet	protects	it	from	the	risk	of	model	formation.	To	effectively	utilise	it	in	the	
design	process,	the	architect	must	frame	aspirational	values	and	generic	principles	as	an	
overarching	type.	The	key	to	this	is	to	understand	the	grammar	that	governs	the	
archetype/morphology	relationship	as	a	contextual	entity.	It	is	the	ability	of	the	type	to	
contain	meaning	through	this	unique	union	that	allows	its	design	potential	to	be	realised.	
	
In	the	architectural	design	process,	typology	it	is	not	only	a	tool	but	a	necessity.	Accepting	
type,	the	architect	cannot	arbitrarily	assign	or	remove	meaning	but	must	communicate	their	
work	through	the	received	conventions	that	tie	morphology	to	archetypal	conditions.	
Typological	reasoning	provides	a	means	to	construct	framing	metaphors	from	typical	human	
experiences	and	connect	the	design	process	to	a	progressive	chain	of	typological	thought.	In	
an	era	of	rapidly	expanding	architectural	possibilities,	type	provides	a	mechanism	to	ground	
expression	in	architectural	reality.	
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